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Abstract
Congress has been increasingly criticized as a broken, gridlocked, polarized, inef-
fective institution. In this paper we seek to explore the consequences of polarization
and whether legislators take steps to alleviate them. We hypothesize that participa-
tion in the voluntary, bipartisan, caucus system provides opportunities for legislators to
build cross-partisan relationships and proﬁt from shared information, which can alle-
viate some of the negative eﬀects of polarization. We operationalize polarization using
dyadic covoting and show that legislators are more likely to covote if they share more
caucus connections, controlling for a variety of factors that predict voting. The data in
this analysis spans 9 congresses (1993-2010) and includes multiple connections between
legislators.
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Introduction
In this paper we seek to examine whether legislators in the US Congress can alleviate
some of the immobilizing eﬀects of partisan polarization through the social and informational
beneﬁts of voluntary caucuses. It is well understood that congress has become increasingly
polarized in recent years. Figure 1 shows the polarization in Congress by party using roll
call votes from 1879-2009 (Poole and Rosenthal 2007). While a vast literature exists to
help explain the sources of this polarization, in this paper we focus on its consequences.
Scholars and pundits frequently point to congressional polarization as a contributing feature
of gridlock in Washington. Meanwhile, new research suggests that some institutional features
of legislatures, such as parties and committee, place constraints on legislators' ability to make
connections with one another and spread information. Legislators, in part, solve this problem
by creating legislative member organizations (LMOs), frequently called caucuses in the U.S.
Congress (Ringe and Victor 2013). Given the recent proliferation of caucuses in Congress
this research explores the possibility that MCs use caucuses to help alleviate some frustration
caused by polarization and gridlock.
Figure 1: Congressional Polarization: DW-Nominate Scores by party 1879-2009
Theory
The roll call record makes the increasing partisan polarization of the U.S. Congress readily
apparent. In the 20-year period between 1992 and 2012 party groups in Congress have
become more internally homogenous, and their medians have become increasingly distant
from one another, according to roll call votes. Roll calls are a reasonable way to measure
the ideological nature of individual legislators and of the Congress, and have formed the
basis for such analyses for decades (e.g., NOMINATE scores, see (Poole and Rosenthal 1997,
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2007). The sources of this increased polarization are numerous and highly related to electoral
competition (Abramowitz and Gunning 2006; Lebo and Koger 2007).
There is also increasing evidence that the polarization in congress results in decreased
productivity, or at least and increased dissatisfaction with the institution (Madison 2012).
Using the resume of the Congress we looked at the overall productivity of Congress during
this time period (Senate 2012).
Figure 2: Legislative productivity of the House of Representatives 1993-2010
Figure 2 shows that while House members have actively and increasingly introduced leg-
islation over the period of study, the percent of their bills that pass into law has declined.
This suggests that single party coalitions pass bills through the chamber that do not become
law. For example, in recent years the Republicans have repealed the Aﬀordable Healthcare
Act ("Obamacare") 37 times (Farenthold 2013). This is a symbolic act of partisan politics,
not a genuine gesture in lawmaking, as Republicans know that President Obama and the
Democratically controlled Senate will not follow course. As the legislative gridlock associ-
ated with partisan polarization increases, some legislators may seek means of alleviating the
negative consequences of gridlock. While it may not be possible to overcome polarization in
a way that leads to increased productivity, legislators may seek ways to increase their level
of contact and interaction with their peersparticularly cross partisans.
Legislators have strong incentives to stay in communication with members of the oppo-
site party because the need for broad-based political and policy information is deep. Also,
legislators have strong incentives to seek interactions with those with whom they are likely to
disagree in order to obtain strategic advantage (Huckfeldt and Sprague. 1987), deeper aware-
ness of opposing viewpoints (Mutz 2006), and to increase the conﬁdence in an individual's
preference ordering by checking it against the preferences of allies or adversaries with known
preferences (Ringe, Victor, and Gross 2013). It is therefore logical to expect lawmakers in
a highly partisan legislature to seek opportunities to interact with cross-partisans oﬀ the
chamber ﬂoor.
For this reason, we expect that members of Congress in highly polarized voting environ-
ments will be more likely to join bipartisan caucuses. If this is true, then we should observe
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growth in the caucus system, and growth in bi-partisan caucuses in particular, to occur as a
result of increasing partisanship, rather than the other way around.
In the forthcoming volume Bridging the Information Gap: Legislative Member Organi-
zations in the United States and European Union, Ringe and Victor show that legislators
use Legislative Member Organizations (LMOs) (e.g., caucuses in congress) to make con-
nections to legislators with whom they are not otherwise connected (see especially Chapter
5) (Ringe and Victor 2013). LMOs, they argue, oﬀer institutional ﬂexibility not oﬀered by
parties and committees. As voluntary organizations with (potentially) unlimited issue scope
caucuses oﬀer an opportunity for MCs to collaborate on issues for which they share policy
priority (but not necessarily preferences). Ringe and Victor show that the casual nature of
caucuses are a beneﬁt to their longevity because for all but the caucus leaders, participa-
tion in caucuses, their events, activities, and communication is low-cost and there are no
consequences for shirking. Moreover, the potential for caucuses to produce valuable and use-
ful information about policy (e.g., expert information) or politics (e.g., legislative strategy
or legislators' revealed preferences) is real, as caucuses tend to be supported by a massive
complex of interest groups that use caucuses as a means to access legislators (see especially
Chapter 6) (Ringe and Victor 2013) (also Hall and Deardorﬀ 2006; Esterling 2007). Inter-
est groups supply caucuses with high quality information which gets quickly disseminated
through the network of caucus members for each caucus. The more caucuses an MC joins,
the higher the probability that s/he will be exposed to such information across a variety of
issue topics.
Caucus participation, then, provides the opportunity for MCs to make connections of
diﬀerent sorts to other legislators. As caucuses are more bi-partisan, the probability of using
caucuses to connect to legislators of the opposite party increases. We therefore expect that
as legislators become more involved in caucuses and have the increased opportunity to be
connected to other legislators their tendency to vote in lock-step with their party will decline.
Legislators who are involved in many caucuses will be exposed to more viewpoints, more
policy proposals, and more colleagues from across the aisle. Those who are most involved in
caucuses, we argue, will be less likely to consistently vote with their party, and be more likely
to buck the party. Caucus participation has the potential to provide beneﬁts to individual
legislators in terms of building relationships and providing access to high quality information
(Ringe and Victor 2013). These activities can decrease polarization if legislators use them to
connect with opposite partisans and get exposed to opposing viewpoints in non-threatening
settings. We therefore have the following expectation.
Hypothesis 1 For any two legislators, as they become more connected in the caucus network
their likelihood of voting the same way will increase, all else being equal.
Research Design
Our eﬀort to understand the complexities of voting behavior requires a deep and longi-
tudinal dataset. Since upwards of 90 percent of voting behavior can be explained by party
or ideology, we must control for these commonalities between legislators and hope to explain
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the remaining variance in roll calls. In this section we describe our data and data collection
process.
Partisan polarization, observed at the dyadic level, is the frequency with which two legis-
lators cast the same votes. We therefore measure polarization as covoting, where polarization
and covoting are negatively associated (see Sinclair 2011). An increase in covoting repre-
sents a decline in polarization. While polarization is frequently represented as an aggregate
measure, summarized by the roll call behavior of legisaltors in a congress, we prefer to dis-
agregate polarization. Taking a dyadic approach, we suggest that a legislative pair who cast
few or no votes alike are "polarized," but a pair who votes alike all the time does not exhibit
polarization. We therefore seek to explain the frequency of dyadic covoting as a function of
caucus participation.
We are, of course, not the ﬁrst to attempt to link social ties to legislative voting. For
example, previous research has considered the impact of friendship (Caldeira and Patterson.
1987), cosponsorship (Cho and Fowler. 2010; Fowler 2006; Koger 2003), spatial proxim-
ity (Masket 2008), staﬀ connections (Ringe, Victor, and Gross 2013), lobbyists' donations
(Koger and Victor 2009), and legislative member organizations, such as caucuses in the US
Congress and intergroups in the European Parliament (EP) (Ringe and Victor 2013).
We collect data on legislators in the U.S. Congress from 1993-2010, or congresses 103-111.
We take a kitchen-sink approach to control variables, because we expect the substantive eﬀect
of caucus participation on covoting to be small. We seek to control for a variety of factors
that are known to determine roll call votes, including serving in the same party, serving on
the same committees, being from the same state, the mean electoral winning percent of the
dyad, the electoral percent diﬀerence, the number of terms served, the number of common
cosponsored bills, serving as a legislative leader (including committee chairs and ranking
members), gender, mean betweenness, and mean degree.
We collect roll call data from the 103rd through 111th congresses (Poole and McCarty
2011). The resources from voteview.com also provide data on legislators' party aﬃliations,
state delegations, and ideological scores (Poole and McCarty 2011). We collected congres-
sional caucus membership information from the same time period by hand recording data
from the Congressional Yellow book (Michaela Buhler 1994-2010). This process included a
member-by-member recording of caucuses listed in the winter volume of the second session
for each congress.1 For more information on this process see Chapter 4 of Ringe and Victor
(2013). We also collected legislative data on congressional committee assignments from
(Nelson 1993, n.d.; Stewart and Woon 2009) and calculate the number of common committee
assignments between all dyads. Additionally, we collected data on legislators' gender, race,
and leadership status (Manning and Shogan 2009, 2010; Tong 2010; Library of Congress
2010; Oﬃce of the Clerk 2010b).2 Electoral winning percent data come from the House
Clerk (Oﬃce of the Clerk 2010a).
This dataset includes 864,879 dyad-Congresses across 295,748 dyads for up to nine Con-
1Yellow books are published quarterly from Leadership Directories, Inc. We opted to collect the data
from one book for each two-year congress, selecting the ﬁnal book published for each congress under the
logic that the ﬁnal book might have the most complete information for a term.
2Legislators are considered a leader if they served as Speaker, Minority/Majority Leader, Minor-
ity/Majority Whip, or the Chair or ranking members on a standing legislative committee.
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Figure 3: Descriptive Statistics for Member of Congress Dyads
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Notes: All dyads for Congresses 103-111. ndyad-Congress = 864879, ndyads = 295748.
6
Figure 4: Descriptive Statistics for Member of Congress Dyads
Dyadic Mean of Terms Served Distribution
median = 3 indicated by vertical line
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Notes: All legislator dyads for Congresses 103-111. ndyad-Congress = 864879, ndyads = 295748.
gresses. Of those dyad-Congresses, 50.2% share the same party, 4.2% are from the same
state, 1.9% are both female, and 1.3% are both leaders. As can be seen in Figures 3 and 4,
the covoting rates and NOMINATE distances are bimodal as is expected given the likelihood
of covoting with copartisans. The number of common caucuses ranges from zero to 39 but
is zero more than half the time, as is the number of common committees. Mean between-
ness and mean degree appear to follow power law distributions, as do the mean number of
terms served and the number of bills cosponsored. The mean electoral % is roughly normally
distributed and the electoral % distance is generally away from zero with a median of 11%.
To test our hypothesis a panel data model is appropriate given that we want to test
the hypothesis where there is variation both across legislator dyads and across Congresses.
There may be concerns about correlation within dyads, so one might include ﬁxed or random
eﬀects by dyad. However in this data set this is not a major concern. Even though we have
data for nine consecutive Congresses the mean number of Congresses per dyad is less than
three, so on average the eﬀects of correlation within dyads is negligible. 3 The model is
3Rerunning the analysis within single Congresses removes completely concerns about correlation within
dyads and yields the same substantive results, thus we report results from the analysis across Congresses.
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Covoting ratei,t = Covoting ratei,t−1+
Number of common caucusesi,t+
Number of common committeesi,t+
Dummy for same partyi,t+
Dummy for same statei,t+
Dummy for both femalei,t+
Dummy for both party leadersi,t+
NOMINATE distancei,t+
Mean betweenness scorei,t+
Mean degreei,t+
Number of measures cosponsoredi,t+
Mean electoral %i,t+
Electoral % distancei,t+
Mean number of terms servedi,t
The lagged dependent variable addresses autocorrelation in the dependent variable. We
estimate the model in R using the plm package to ensure our measures of uncertainty take
into account the panel structure of the data.
Results
Given the size of the dataset we expect that coeﬃcient estimates are measurably diﬀeren-
tiable from zero, and except for the mean number of terms served we are able to distinguish
these coeﬃcients from zero. The results for the control variables largely comport with expec-
tations. For instance, larger NOMINATE distance between members of a dyad is associated
with much less covoting and being members of the same party is associated with more
covoting.
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Table 1: Covoting Rate by Members of Congress
Estimate SE t-value p-value
(Intercept) 0.26745 0.00100 267.79458 0.00000
(lagged DV) 0.62273 0.00104 599.16819 0.00000
Number of common caucuses 0.00302 0.00007 44.03197 0.00000
Number of common committees -0.00046 0.00017 -2.65690 0.00789
Dummy for same party 0.04104 0.00038 108.32349 0.00000
Dummy for same state -0.00286 0.00037 -7.67071 0.00000
Dummy for both female -0.00420 0.00058 -7.21858 0.00000
Dummy for both party leaders 0.00381 0.00060 6.34343 0.00000
NOMINATE distance -0.12306 0.00051 -239.46165 0.00000
Mean betweenness score 0.00000 0.00000 4.22019 0.00002
Mean degree -0.00002 0.00000 -73.63501 0.00000
Number of measures cosponsored 0.00022 0.00000 108.95901 0.00000
Mean electoral % 0.00044 0.00001 49.41905 0.00000
Electoral % distance -0.00008 0.00001 -11.29045 0.00000
Mean number of terms served 0.00002 0.00003 0.88245 0.37753
Notes: Dropped 103rd Congress due to inclusion of lagged dependent variable. Includes all
legislator dyads for Congresses 104-111. ndyad-Congress = 769613, ndyads = 262497.
The coeﬃcient on the number of common caucuses is about .003. One way to look at this
is that one additional common caucus is associated with three additional votes in agreement
across a 1000-vote congress. Another interpretation is that three additional common caucuses
is associated with about a 1% higher covoting rate.
Conclusion
In this paper, we recognize that partisan polarization in congress has left some members of
congress frustrated with its associated gridlock. Congressional caucuses provide an excellent
institutional setting in which legislators can seek refuge from gridlock because they are
voluntary, bipartisan, tend to be focused on substantive topics of interest to legislators, and
provide important opportunities for developing relationships across the aisle and obtaining
access to high quality information. Caucuses are also oﬀer a very low cost of membership.
We therefore hypothesize that as congress becomes more polarized caucus participation will
increase as a means of alleviating the negative consequences of polarization.
We measure polarization as covoting and show that covoting increases as a result of
common caucus participation, all else being equal. The substantive eﬀect of caucus partici-
pation is small; each additional common caucus is associated with three additional votes in
agreement in a 1000-vote congress.
There is a complicated causal feedback in this system that we have not fully teased out.
Increased polarization causes caucus participation, because polarization breeds frustration
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and caucuses and potentially alleviate that. But here we show that caucus participation
causes decreased polarization. We seek to better leverage our time series data to tease out
these eﬀects. Additionally, our data oﬀer opportunities to leverage the multiple connections
between legislators on which we have observable data. We encourage readers to provide
comments along these lines to help improve this research.
While these results are promising we seek to go further with this project and strengthen
the inferential link between the theoretical claim that legislators use caucuses to seek re-
lationships with those whom they would not otherwise have much opportunity to connect,
and that caucuses have the potential to help alleviate legislative gridlock caused by hyper-
partisanship and polarization. There is a wealth of data that we have not yet explored,
including graph-level properties of these multiplex networks. We suspect we can learn some-
thing about the functionality of congress by examining these properties overtime.
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